Difference between revisions of "AI safety"
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** [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=27KDl2uPiL8 We Can’t Stop AI – Here’s What To Do Instead] (4m video, 2025) | ** [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=27KDl2uPiL8 We Can’t Stop AI – Here’s What To Do Instead] (4m video, 2025) | ||
** [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zeabrXV8zNE The 4 Rules That Could Stop AI Before It’s Too Late] (15m video, 2025) | ** [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zeabrXV8zNE The 4 Rules That Could Stop AI Before It’s Too Late] (15m video, 2025) | ||
| + | * Tristan Harris TED talk (15m): [https://www.ted.com/talks/tristan_harris_why_ai_is_our_ultimate_test_and_greatest_invitation Why AI is our ultimate test and greatest invitation] | ||
| + | ** Text version: Center for Humane Technology: [https://centerforhumanetechnology.substack.com/p/the-narrow-path-why-ai-is-our-ultimate The Narrow Path: Why AI is Our Ultimate Test and Greatest Invitation] | ||
==Deep== | ==Deep== | ||
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* 2024-02: [https://yoshuabengio.org/2024/02/26/towards-a-cautious-scientist-ai-with-convergent-safety-bounds/ Towards a Cautious Scientist AI with Convergent Safety Bounds] (Yoshua Bengio) | * 2024-02: [https://yoshuabengio.org/2024/02/26/towards-a-cautious-scientist-ai-with-convergent-safety-bounds/ Towards a Cautious Scientist AI with Convergent Safety Bounds] (Yoshua Bengio) | ||
* 2024-07: [https://yoshuabengio.org/2024/07/09/reasoning-through-arguments-against-taking-ai-safety-seriously/ Reasoning through arguments against taking AI safety seriously] (Yoshua Bengio) | * 2024-07: [https://yoshuabengio.org/2024/07/09/reasoning-through-arguments-against-taking-ai-safety-seriously/ Reasoning through arguments against taking AI safety seriously] (Yoshua Bengio) | ||
| + | * 2025-04: [https://www.forethought.org/research/ai-enabled-coups-how-a-small-group-could-use-ai-to-seize-power AI-Enabled Coups: How a Small Group Could Use AI to Seize Power] | ||
==Long-term (x-risk)== | ==Long-term (x-risk)== | ||
| Line 39: | Line 42: | ||
=Status= | =Status= | ||
* 2025-01: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/679a0c48a77d250007d313ee/International_AI_Safety_Report_2025_accessible_f.pdf International Safety Report: The International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI (January 2025)] | * 2025-01: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/679a0c48a77d250007d313ee/International_AI_Safety_Report_2025_accessible_f.pdf International Safety Report: The International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI (January 2025)] | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==Assessmment== | ||
| + | * [https://aiassessmentscale.com/ AI Assessment Scale (AIAS)]: A practical framework to guide the appropriate and ethical use of generative AI in assessment design, empowering educators to make purposeful, evidence-based decisions | ||
==Policy== | ==Policy== | ||
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* 2025-03: [https://assets.anthropic.com/m/317564659027fb33/original/Auditing-Language-Models-for-Hidden-Objectives.pdf Auditing language models for hidden objectives] (Anthropic, [https://www.anthropic.com/research/auditing-hidden-objectives blog]) | * 2025-03: [https://assets.anthropic.com/m/317564659027fb33/original/Auditing-Language-Models-for-Hidden-Objectives.pdf Auditing language models for hidden objectives] (Anthropic, [https://www.anthropic.com/research/auditing-hidden-objectives blog]) | ||
* 2025-03: [https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.13621 Superalignment with Dynamic Human Values] | * 2025-03: [https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.13621 Superalignment with Dynamic Human Values] | ||
| + | * 2025-04: [https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.15125 Contemplative Wisdom for Superalignment] | ||
| + | * 2025-04: [https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/x59FhzuM9yuvZHAHW/untitled-draft-yhra Scaling Laws for Scalable Oversight] ([https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.18530 preprint], [https://github.com/subhashk01/oversight-scaling-laws code]) | ||
==Demonstrations of Negative Use Capabilities== | ==Demonstrations of Negative Use Capabilities== | ||
* 2024-12: [https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.00586 Evaluating Large Language Models' Capability to Launch Fully Automated Spear Phishing Campaigns: Validated on Human Subjects] | * 2024-12: [https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.00586 Evaluating Large Language Models' Capability to Launch Fully Automated Spear Phishing Campaigns: Validated on Human Subjects] | ||
| + | * 2025-04: [https://www.nathanlabenz.com/ Nathan Labenz] ([https://www.cognitiverevolution.ai/ The Cognitive Revolution]): [https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1mvkpg1mtAvGzTiiwYPc6bKOGsQXDIwMb-ytQECb3i7I/edit#slide=id.g252d9e67d86_0_16 AI Bad Behavior] | ||
=See Also= | =See Also= | ||
* [[AI predictions]] | * [[AI predictions]] | ||
Latest revision as of 15:46, 20 May 2025
Contents
Learning Resources
Light
- Writing Doom (27m video): short film on Superintelligence (2024)
- a casual intro to AI doom and alignment (2022)
- Anthony Aguirre: Keep The Future Human
- Interactive Explainer
- Essay: Keep the Future Human
- We Can’t Stop AI – Here’s What To Do Instead (4m video, 2025)
- The 4 Rules That Could Stop AI Before It’s Too Late (15m video, 2025)
- Tristan Harris TED talk (15m): Why AI is our ultimate test and greatest invitation
- Text version: Center for Humane Technology: The Narrow Path: Why AI is Our Ultimate Test and Greatest Invitation
Deep
- The Compendium: Humanity risks extinction from its very creations — AIs. (2024)
- Introduction to AI Safety, Ethics, and Society (Dan Hendrycks, Center for AI Safety)
- AI Safety FAQ
- DeepMind short course on AGI safety
Description of Safety Concerns
Key Concepts
- Instrumental Convergence
- Orthogonality Thesis
- Inner/outer alignment
- Mesa-optimization
- Overhang
- Reward is not the optimization target (Alex Turner)
Medium-term Risks
- 2023-04: A.I. Dilemma – Tristan Harris and Aza Raskin” (video) (.website-files.com/5f0e1294f002b1bb26e1f304/64224a9051a6637c1b60162a_65-your-undivided-attention-The-AI-Dilemma-transcript.pdf podcast transcript): raises concern about human ability to handle these transformations
- 2023-04: Daniel Schmachtenberger and Liv Boeree (video): AI could accelerate perverse social dynamics
- 2023-10: Sociotechnical Safety Evaluation of Generative AI Systems (Google DeepMind)
- 2024-02: Towards a Cautious Scientist AI with Convergent Safety Bounds (Yoshua Bengio)
- 2024-07: Reasoning through arguments against taking AI safety seriously (Yoshua Bengio)
- 2025-04: AI-Enabled Coups: How a Small Group Could Use AI to Seize Power
Long-term (x-risk)
- 2015-02: Sam Altman: Machine intelligence, part 1
- 2022-06: List AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities (Eliezer Yudkowsky)
- 2024-11: ‘Interpretability’ and ‘alignment’ are fool’s errands: a proof that controlling misaligned large language models is the best anyone can hope for (Marcus Arvan)
- 2025-04: ASI existential risk: reconsidering alignment as a goal
Status
Assessmment
- AI Assessment Scale (AIAS): A practical framework to guide the appropriate and ethical use of generative AI in assessment design, empowering educators to make purposeful, evidence-based decisions
Policy
- 2024-07: On the Limitations of Compute Thresholds as a Governance Strategy Sara Hooker
- 2024-07: Framework Convention on Global AI Challenges (CIGI)
- 2024-08: NIST guidelines: Managing Misuse Risk for Dual-Use Foundation Models
Proposals
- 2025-02: Responsible AI Agents
- 2025-03: Control AI The Direct Institutional Plan
- 2025-04: Google DeepMind: Taking a responsible path to AGI
Research
- 2022-09: The alignment problem from a deep learning perspective
- 2022-12: Discovering Latent Knowledge in Language Models Without Supervision
- 2023-02: Pretraining Language Models with Human Preferences
- 2023-04: Do the Rewards Justify the Means? Measuring Trade-Offs Between Rewards and Ethical Behavior in the MACHIAVELLI Benchmark
- 2023-05: Model evaluation for extreme risks (DeepMind)
- 2023-05: Principle-Driven Self-Alignment of Language Models from Scratch with Minimal Human Supervision
- 2023-06: Preference Ranking Optimization for Human Alignment
- 2023-08: Self-Alignment with Instruction Backtranslation
- 2023-11: Debate Helps Supervise Unreliable Experts
- 2023-12: Weak-to-Strong Generalization: Eliciting Strong Capabilities with Weak Supervision (OpenAI, blog)
- 2023-12: Practices for Governing Agentic AI Systems (OpenAI, blog)
- 2024-01: Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist through Safety Training (Anthropic)
- 2024-04: The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructions (OpenAI)
- 2024-07: On scalable oversight with weak LLMs judging strong LLMs
- 2024-07: Safetywashing: Do AI Safety Benchmarks Actually Measure Safety Progress? (Dan Hendrycks et al.)
- 2024-08: Tamper-Resistant Safeguards for Open-Weight LLMs (project, code)
- 2024-08: Better Alignment with Instruction Back-and-Forth Translation
- 2024-10: First-Person Fairness in Chatbots (OpenAI, blog)
- 2024-10: Sabotage evaluations for frontier models (Anthropic, blog)
- 2024-12: Alignment Faking in Large Language Models (Anthropic)
- 2024-12: Best-of-N Jailbreaking (code)
- 2024-12: Towards Safe and Honest AI Agents with Neural Self-Other Overlap
- 2024-12: Deliberative Alignment: Reasoning Enables Safer Language Models (OpenAI)
- 2025-01: Trading Inference-Time Compute for Adversarial Robustness (OpenAI, blog)
- 2025-01: Constitutional Classifiers: Defending against Universal Jailbreaks across Thousands of Hours of Red Teaming (Anthropic, blog,
- 2025-02: Utility Engineering: Analyzing and Controlling Emergent Value Systems in AIs (site, github)
- 2025-02: Auditing Prompt Caching in Language Model APIs
- 2025-03: The Alignment Problem from a Deep Learning Perspective
- 2025-03: Auditing language models for hidden objectives (Anthropic, blog)
- 2025-03: Superalignment with Dynamic Human Values
- 2025-04: Contemplative Wisdom for Superalignment
- 2025-04: Scaling Laws for Scalable Oversight (preprint, code)
Demonstrations of Negative Use Capabilities
- 2024-12: Evaluating Large Language Models' Capability to Launch Fully Automated Spear Phishing Campaigns: Validated on Human Subjects
- 2025-04: Nathan Labenz (The Cognitive Revolution): AI Bad Behavior
